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Health Insurance Reform and Its Effects on the
Small Employer Market: A Review of H.R. 3626
P. Anthony Hammond*

Abstract t
This paper provides a detailed analysis of H.R. 3626, a bill that is intended to
improve employers' and employees' access to health care. H.R. 3626 attempts
to accomplish this through the use of guaranteed availability, community rating, and generous standard benefits. A migration model is used to analyze the
impact of H.R. 3626. Using this model, it is shown that while improving the
availability and affordability of health insurance, its rating restrictions increase
premiums disproportionately for the majority of small employers. In addition,
H.R. 3626 increases the number of uninsured small employers.
Key words and phrases: rating restrictions, community rating, cost containment, redistributional effects, migration effects
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Introduction

The majority of Americans obtain their health insurance coverage
through an employer-provided health plan. In spite of this fact, many

* Anthony Hammond, A.S.A., M.A.A.A., is an associate director and actuary policy at
the Health Insurance Association of America. His responsibilities include assessing the
costs and implications of federal and state health care reform proposals.
Mr. Hammond's address is: Health Association of America, 1025 Connecticut Avenue
NW, Washington DC 20036-3998, USA.
Mr. Hammond thanks the editor and the anonymous referees for their numerous
helpful comments and suggestions.
tThis paper is a revision of an analysis prepared for the Health Insurance Association of America. Given the current debate on national health care reform, I hope to
provide some insights into the methodologies that may be used to analyze the impact
of health insurance market reforms and impart an appreciation for the actuarial complexity inherent in these reforms and the consequences of these reforms for insurers,
employers, and employees.
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working Americans are still uninsured, especially those who work for
small employers. 1 One may argue that the main reason why these workers are uninsured may have more to do with economics than insurance.
Yet there are problems in the small employer health insurance market
that are exacerbating the problem of the working uninsured. BaSically,
these are problems of access, affordability, and coverage.
Several small group reform proposals dealing with these problems
have been presented to the United States Congress. 2 These proposals
generally promulgate restrictions on health insurance premiums and
cost containment measures to improve affordability; require insurers
to issue and guarantee renewal of policies to small employer groups
in order to improve access (availability) of health insurance; and provide portability (continuity) of coverage when employers or individuals
change carriers or jobs or when insurers leave the market.
In spite of their similarities, however, the various proposals are often quite different in their specific provisions. One major difference is
how much premiums are allowed to vary (rating restrictions) and the
definition of a small employer. The question remains, however, as to
how effec;tive these proposals are at resolving some or all of the problems in the small employer market and whether the cost exceeds the
benefits to small employers, their employees, insurers, and society as
a whole.
This paper examines the efficacy of H.R. 3626, The Health Insurance Reform and Cost Control Act of 1991. H.R. 3626 includes all of
the approaches mentioned above and goes one step further. It establishes a minimum standard for benefits that must be covered by a small
employer health insurance plan. H.R. 3626 does not include, however,
reforms such as health risk adjusters, employer mandates, or individual health insurance reforms. Discussion of these reforms is beyond
the scope of this paper.
The ability of H.R. 3626 to improve access, affordability, and coverage in the small employer market is analyzed using data from Health
Insurance Association of America 3 (HIAA) member companies and two
1A small employer is defined throughout this paper to be an employer that employs
two to 50 employees.
2 As of October 1994, the United States Congress has been unable to pass comprehensive health care reform legislation. So the focus of the health care reform debate has
returned to insurance market reforms such as those proposed just a few years ago for
small employers. Although these reforms are called incremental by policymakers, they
will have a considerable impact on insurers, as these reforms represent a significant
departure from past insurance practices.
3The Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) is a Washington, D.C.-based
trade association of the United States' leading commercial insurance carriers. HIAA
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actuarial models. One model analyzes the impact of rating restrictions
on a sample of small employers insured by five different commercial
insurers. The other model (called a migration model) combines the relative morbidity (net claim cost) of each segment of the changing small
employer population in order to estimate the change (as a result of H.R.
3626) in the average premium of all small employers insured by small
group insurers.
The insurers chosen for this study represent five insurers with significant sales in the commercial, small employer, group health insurance market. The insurers reflect the broad spectrum of underwriting
practices that are experienced in the market: from carriers with demographic rating (premiums vary based on age, sex, area, family status) to
carriers with aggressive underwriting. Further, while an effort is made
to obtain data from a group of carriers that is representative of the small
employer group market, it is not possible to determine accurately how
representative these carriers are. Therefore, the estimates should not
be considered as industry estimates but as the composite experience
of five insurers. The results presented in this paper are averages, so it
always should be kept in mind that specific insurers and employers will
have results that will be higher or lower than the average. In addition,
it must be pointed out that small group reforms that already have been
implemented in several states will limit the impact of implementing
reforms on a national level.
I have tried to make this paper as detailed as possible, but the complexity of small employer market reforms contained in H.R. 3626 and
other proposals have exceeded the available data. In response, I have
concentrated on those areas that will have the greatest impact on the
small employer market, highlighting those factors and effects that will
be of greatest concern to policymakers, small employers, insurers, and
the small employer population.
Findings from this actuarial study and their implications are presented in detail in the next five sections. Section 2 gives an overview
of the results of this paper. Section 3 describes the redistribution of
small employer premiums as a result of H.R. 3626 rating restrictions.
Section 4 details the changes in the insured and uninsured small employer populations and the effect these population changes will have
on small employer premiums. The impact on rates of standardized
benefits is described in Section 5. Section 6 covers the impact of cost
containment provisions. Section 7 deals with the provisions that canrepresents the majority of the nation's commercial insurance companies. HlAA's activities range broadly from education to legislative analysis to collecting and disseminating data and information.
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not be quantified; it also gives suggestions for areas of further study.
Section 8 contains the summary and conclusions. Appendix A contains
a summary of the basic provisions of H.R. 3626. Appendix B contains a
summary of the provisions of H.R. 3626 that affect rating. Appendix C
describes the assumptions of the actuarial model under optimistic, best
estimate, and pessimistic scenarios; and gives a quantitative evaluation
(based on my best estimate) of H.R. 3626's impact on small employers.

2 Overview of the Impact of H.R. 3626
If enacted, H.R. 3626 will make significant changes to the small employer (two to 50 employees) market for health insurance. 4 In particular, it will:
• Guarantee that every small employer will have access to coverage;
• Guarantee that all employees (working at least 17.5 hours a week
for a small employer with a health insurance plan) and their dependents will be eligible to participate in the employer-provided
plan; and
• Make health insurance more affordable for higher risk small employers (thereby providing coverage to more high risk uninsureds).
But it also will
• Make health insurance less affordable for the majority of small
employers (more than three-quarters of small employers will receive rate increases of 10 percent or more; see Table 1). For example, Table 1 shows that 19 percent of employees will receive a
rate increase of more than 35 percent, 13 percent will retain their
coverage, and 6 percent will choose to drop their coverage;
• Increase the small employer average premium per employee 8 to
24 percent, on average, adding an estimated three to nine billion
dollars to small employer costs. s This increase in the average premium is in addition to the rate increases most small employers will
receive as a result of rating restrictions. Some small employers,
however, will receive decreases in rates; and
.
4This study only addresses the impact of H.R. 3626 on the small employer market,
but H.R. 3626 also sets forth portability requirements that apply to all group health
plans.
SMy best estimate is that premiums will rise 12.3 percent, adding $5.6 billion to
small employer costs.
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Table 1
Distribution of Rate Changes for Currently Insured
Small Employers (two to 25 Employees) and the Percentage of Employees Keeping or Dropping Coverage
Under H.R. 3626
Percentage Rate Change* Keep Drop
Total
More than 35%
13%
6%
19%
23%
3%
26%
19% to 35%
7% to 19%
33%
1%
34%
-10% to 7%
13%
0%
13%
Less than -10%
8%
0%
8%
Source: Health Insurance Association of America.
*Includes 12.3 percent (best estimate) increase in market average rate.

• Increase the total number of uninsureds 2 to 5 percent, adding an
estimated one to two million persons to the total uninsured. 6 This
occurs in spite of the one to two million uninsureds who rejoin the
market. These new additions are offset by the one to four million
(mostly low risk) employers and employees who leave the market.
In addition, the tendency will be for these new uninsureds to be
younger, to have lower incomes, and to work for the smallest of
the small employers. Many will be children.
The percentage of employers receiving rate increases and the magnitude of those increases are related directly to the degree of rate compression created by rating restrictions. Consequently, the nearly flat
community rating of H.R. 3626 leads to more and greater rate increases
for employers than might other, less restrictive proposals.
Furthermore, these rate increases are in addition to trend increases
and are a direct result of the combination of the access, rating, and
benefit provisions of H.R. 3626. (See Table Al in Appendix A for a
summary of these prOvisions.) H.R. 3626 also will lead to significant
changes in who will be insured in the small employer market. Some of
these changes are described briefly below.
• Rating Restrictions: Under H.R. 3626 rating restrictions, the premium increase experienced by individual small employers will
vary widely. Rating restrictions will increase rates significantly
6My best estimate is that the total number of uninsureds will increase 3.4 percent,
adding an estimated 1.3 million persons to the total uninsured.
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for two-thirds of the currently insured small employers and their
employees. Lower income employers and younger employees will
be forced to subsidize higher income employers and older employees. Premiums no longer will reflect expected claims, except
in the aggregate.
Rating restrictions also lead to a larger percentage rate increase
for the smaller small employers than for the larger small employers. This probably reflects two factors: the greater likelihood of
the smaller small employers purchasing coverage only if they have
a lower than average risk (and, therefore, premium) and the impact of insurer underwriting.
• Changes in the Insured, Small Employer Population: The combined results of the H.R. 3626 rating, access, and benefit provisions will be to make health insurance more affordable and accessible for higher risk groups and less affordable for average and
lower risk groups. This will lead to adverse selection, Le., persons
who have higher than average health care costs will tend to purchase insurance and those who have lower than average costs will
tend not to do so.
Lower risk employers who don't want to drop their coverage also
may switch to other forms of coverage that now may be less costly
(as a result of H.R. 3626) than group insurance. In addition, the
tight rating bands of H.R. 3626 will result in more adverse selection than proposals with less severe rating bands. Thus, H.R. 3626
leads to greater changes in the insured, small employer population than other proposals might. Altogether, H.R. 3626 leads to
an 8 to 24 percent average increase in the average premium for
small employers and to fewer small employers and their employees being insured .
• Standardized Benefits: H.R. 3626 standardizes benefits for small
employer plans by preempting state mandates and promulgating a
standard benefit package. The standard benefit package is similar
to Parts A and B of Medicare, but it also includes certain preventive
services with first dollar coverage.?
H.R. 3626 increases the self-employment deduction for health insurance and adds four portability provisions that will apply to
all group health plans, regardless of size, including self-insured
7 First dollar coverage refers to crwerages with no deductible or coinsurance paid by
the insured. All charges are fully covered by the insurer.
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plans. The portability requirements are: (i) an excise tax (25 percent of gross premium for the plan) for failure to provide all of
these portability benefits; (ii) a prohibition against denying, limiting, or conditioning coverage (or benefits) on health status; (iii) a
maximum six month preexisting condition limitation (except for
newborns); and (iv) a continuity of coverage provision that mandates credit for prior coverage if no more than a three month break
in coverage has occurred.
The combination of these benefits is expected to increase premiums about 4 to 5 percent overall for small employers because
these benefits, in aggregate, are more generous than the average
plan of benefits that small employers currently offer .
• Cost Containment Provisions: H.R. 3626 calls for the establishment of a national health care cost containment commission soon
after the bill's enactment. It also requires the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to develop optional, maximum payment rates
for hospitals, physicians, and other health services by October
1, 1994 and annually thereafter. The rates are to be based on
DRG (diagnosis-related group) and RBRVS (resource-based relative value scale) methodologies similar to what Medicare currently
uses.
These cost containment provisions are too nebulous to justify any
estimated reduction in costs at this time. While some studies have
estimated significant savings from using current Medicare reimbursement maximums, it is by no means certain that the payment
rates eventually approved will be so low. To the extent that the
optional DRG and RBRVS rates are used uniformly by health care
payors, including government, however, some reductions in cost
shifting may occur.

Thus, although H.R. 3626 will improve the availability of coverage
for small employers and portability of coverage for all employees, the
severe rating restrictions in a voluntary market (without mandated universal coverage) will lead to more persons being uninsured than at
present. It will force many small employers to pay a high price to make
coverage more affordable for a few small employers. In short, its costs
will far exceed its benefits.
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Rating Restrictions

3.1

The Redistribution of Small Employer Premiums

Most of the provisions in H.R. 3626 that will have a direct impact
upon rating are summarized in Appendix B. H.R. 3626 calls for community rating of all small employer (two to 50 employees) health insurance
plans with only a ±25 percent adjustment in rates for age and gender
if applied consistently to all small employers.
The redistributional effects (or first order effects as they sometimes
are called) are the effects of applying the H.R. 3626 rating restrictions
to premiums for currently insured employers before any changes occur
in the insured population. That is, before anyone migrates to or from
(enters or leaves) the small employer market.
Rating restrictions limit the range of premiums that insurers can
charge small employers. They redistribute premium rates charged to
employers about the average (mean) rate, but the mean rate remains
unchanged. As a result, premiums will increase for some employers
and decrease for others.
In the discussion of the redistributional effects of H.R. 3626's rating
restrictions, the following must be kept in mind:
1. The insured population is held constant when examining the ef-

fect of H.R. 3626 rating restrictions on currently insured, small
employer groups;
2. The redistributional effects do not include the effects of changes
in the insured and uninsured small employer population. The
changes in the insured and uninsured small employer population
are in addition to the redistributional effects described in this
section;
3. The aggregate premium generated from all small employer groups
is assumed to be the same before and after rating restrictions are
applied. Thus, the average premium is not changed by the effects
of H.R. 3626.
4. The change in small employer premium due to redistributional
effects is the premium the employer pays after rating restrictions
less the premium it paid before rating restrictions. The after premium must not include any increases due to the trend increase
employers will receive at renewal or any other increases resulting
from H.R. 3626.
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5. By definition, there is no redistributional effect on the uninsured
because it is a first order effect, i.e., before migration.

3.2 Methodology
The estimates given in this section are derived from an analysis of
a representative sample of actual small employer group data from five
different HIAA member companies. Data are collected for similar feefor-service, indemnity benefit plans (similar to a $200 deductible, 80
percent coinsurance plan), a representative mix of employers for each
insurer, and a representative mix by age/sex, industry, area, size, and
other small group rating factors for each insurer.
The data are normalized for each insurer before being run through
an actuarial model that recalculates the premium each insurer charges
each of the 3,750 small employers in the sample using the H.R. 3626
rating restrictions. Geographic factors also are normalized for each insurer, but otherwise are unaffected across insurers. The total premium
for each insurer is not changed, but the premium for each employer
group is restricted to the H.R. 3626 rating bands such that some employers receive increases and others receive decreases.
The insurers chosen for this study represent five insurers with significant sales in the commercial, small employer, group health insurance market. This group includes insurers with broad and tight underwriting practices. While aggregated estimates are provided, there are
large variations between insurers. This suggests that the effect of rate
limits will vary greatly from one insurer to another. Further, while an
effort is made to obtain data from a group of carriers that will be fairly
representative of the small employer group market, there is no way to
determine accurately how representative these carriers are. Therefore,
the estimates should not be considered industry estimates but should
be considered as the composite experience of five insurers.
Representative databases of groups with two to nine employees and
ten to 25 employees are obtained from each of the five insurance companies. The two to nine and ten to 25 data are analyzed separately
and then combined. The results for groups with two to nine employees
are in the same direction but more pronounced than the results for the
combined market (Le., groups with two to 25 employees). Results are
somewhat less pronounced for groups with ten to 25 employees.
The database includes employer groups with two to 25 employees
rather than groups with two to 50 employees (the definition of a small
employer in H.R. 3626). But comparing the effect ofH.R. 3626 on groups
with two to nine employees versus its effect on groups with ten to 25

14
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employees indicates that H.R. 3626 has relatively less impact on the ten
to 25 employee groups. Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that the
effect of H.R. 3626 on groups with 26 to 50 employees will be even less.
Hence, groups with two to 25 can serve effectively as proxies for the two
to 50 employee groups without significantly affecting the conclusions
of this study.

3.3

Impact on Small Employers

Even though the overall average premium remains unchanged, the
premium per capita8 for almost every employer group either will increase or decrease as a result of H.R. 3626. Therefore, the distribution
of rates will change. The change in the distribution of premium rates
for insured employer groups before rating restrictions, and before migration and expanded benefits, is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. Figure
1 shows the distribution of premium rates for insured employer groups
before rating restrictions, and before migration and expanded benefits
(Le., before H.R. 3626) as a percentage of the mean rate, while Figure 2
shows the distribution after H.R. 3626 rating restrictions are applied.
The impact of the H.R. 3626 rating restrictions on individual small
employer groups is examined by determining the premium increase (or
decrease) each employer will receive under H.R. 3626's rating restrictions. The employers are grouped into five categories based on the level
of the employer's percentage change from its current premiums. Then
the subSidy provided by low average age employers to high average
age employers is examined. Last, the subsidy provided by the smallest
small employers to larger small employers and the price sensitivity of
the smallest small employers are examined.
Rating restrictions will affect each small employer differently. H.R.
3626 restricts small employer rates to a narrow band, forcing all but a
handful of employers to receive premium increases or decreases. These
first order effects on the total premium for each small employer in
the sample are illustrated in Tables 2, 3, and 4. Table 2, for example,
shows that 19 percent of employers with two to 25 employees will have
an increase in premium of more than 20 percent from H.R. 3626 rating
restrictions alone. For this 19 percent of employers, however, increases
will range from 21 percent to 238 percent, and the average increase for
all employers receiving more than a 20 percent increase will be 36.6
percent. More than two-thirds of all employer groups (68 percent) will
BThe premium per capita is the total premium for the employer group divided by
the total number of employees and dependents covered by the employer.
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Figure 1
Distribution of Premium Rates of Currently Insured Employers
Before Rating Restrictions, Migration and Expanded Benefits

20
".......

;:,g
0

18

.S:

16

0.

14

e

12

:J

(9

'0
Q)

10
8

C>

co
+-'
C

Q)

6

~

4

a.

2

Q)

0
50

60

70

80

90 100 110 120 130 140 160 180 200 220 250 300325+

Percentage of Average Premium (in %)

receive premium increases from rating restrictions. Nearly half of all
employer groups (45 percent) will receive premium increases greater
than 5 percent.
Table 2
Distribution of Rate Changes for Currently Insured
Small Employers (two to 25 Employees) Under H.R.
3626 Before Migration and Expanded Benefits
% of Employees
Percentage Rate Change
More than 20%
19%
26%
6% to 20%
34%
-6% to 6%
-20% to -6%
l3%
Less than -20%
8%
Source: Health Insurance Association of America.
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Figure 2
Distribution of Premium Rates of Currently Insured Employers
After Rating Restrictions, but Before Migration and Expanded
Benefits
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To examine the extent to which low average age employers subsidize high average age employers, increases in premiums for the onefifth (the fifth quintile) of employers with the lowest average employee
age are compared to the increases in premiums for all small employers. If the percentage of employers receiving a premium increase is
similar in each premium-increase category, it indicates that little or no
extra subsidy is demanded from the employers with a younger group
of employees. The results, howev~r, show that considerably more low
average age employers will receive premium increases than will all employers. Compared to the 68 percent of employers receiving premium
increases among all employers, 82 percent of low average age employers are expected to receive premium increases.
Table 3 shows that, in contrast to the 19 percent of employers that
will receive a premium increase of more than 20 percent, 30 percent
of low average age employers will receive premium increases of this
magnitude. Additionally, only 10 percent of low average age employers
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will receive a significant premium decrease versus 21 percent of all
employers.
Table 3
Distribution of Rate Changes for the Youngest
Quintile of Small Employers (two to 25 Employees) Under H.R. 3626 Before Migration
and Expanded Benefits
% of Employees
Percentage Rate Change
30%
More than 20%
30%
6% to 20%
30%
-6% to 6%
-20% to -6%
7%
3%
Less than -20%
Source: Health Insurance Association of America.

While the direction of this result is not surprising, its magnitude is
significant and indicates the extent to which H.R. 3626 shifts rates from
the actuarial goal of consistency between premiums and risk assumed
(Le., premiums no longer reasonably reflect expected claims, except in
the aggregate). Also, because of the clear relationship between higher
ages and higher incomes, this has the perverse effect of forCing lower
income employees to subsidize higher income employees. Thus, the
redistributional effect of H.R. 3626 is regressive.
To examine the extent to which the smallest of the small employers will subsidize larger small employers, increases in premiums for the
largest size quintile of employers insured by each carrier (generally, employers with more than 15 employees) are compared to the increases in
premiums for all small employers. Again, if the percentage of employers receiving a premium increase is similar in each premium increase
category, it indicates that little or no extra subSidy exists. The results
of this model, however, indicate that considerably fewer of the larger
small employers will receive premium increases when compared to all
small employers. Compared to the 68 percent of all employers that will
receive increases (increases ranging up to 238 percent), only 59 percent
of larger small employers will receive increases (increases ranging only
as high as 131 percent).
Table 4 shows that 12 percent of these larger small employers (versus 19 percent of all employers) will receive a premium increase of more
than 20 percent. Likewise, in contrast to the overall statistic that 32 percent of small employers will receive a premium decrease, 41 percent of
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the larger small employers will receive a decrease. That is, larger small
employers are almost one-third more likely to receive decreases than
the smallest of the small employers.
Table 4
Distribution of Rate Changes for the Largest
Quintile of Small Employers (two to 25 Employees) Under H.R. 3626 Before Migration
and Expanded Benefits
Percentage Rate Change
% of Employees
More than 20%
12%
6% to 20%
22%
-6% to 6%
42%
-20% to -6%
15%
Less than -20%
7%
Source: Health Insurance Association of America.

There are several ways that Table 4 can be interpreted. The most
simplistic way is that the smallest employers pay less because carriers
underwrite the smallest employers more aggressively and select better
risks, on average. If this is true, the fifth quintile of small employers
will have the greatest increases. Upon reviewing the data on the fifth
quintile of small employers and comparing it to all small employers,
however, the results are ambiguous.
Alternatively, Table 4 can be interpreted as an illustration of the
greater price sensitivity of the smallest of the small employers. Because the larger small employers have about the same percentage of
premium decreases as all small employers, those larger small employers seem as willing as all small employers to pay the increases when
premiums rise. But a smaller percentage of larger small employers
receive premium increases than all small employers. As a result, the
smallest small employers appear to be either less willing or unable to
purchase coverage unless they have a lower than average risk and, as a
consequence, receive a lower than average premium. This indicates the
greater price sensitivity of the smallest small employers.
It is probably most reasonable to interpret Table 4 as demonstrating
the combined result of underwriting decisions by carriers and the price
sensitivity of the smallest small employers.
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Impact on Insurers

All insurers are not affected equally under H.R. 3626. The impact of
the H.R. 3626 rating restrictions on insurers varies depending on the
mix of high and low cost insureds that the insurer underwrites. For
example, in contrast to the 19 percent of employers that will receive a
premium increase of more than 20 percent, one insurer in the sample
will have 37 percent of employers with increases that large.
The rating restrictions in H.R. 3626 break the actuarial link between
the premiums insurers charge and the risks they assume. Thus, premiums no longer will reflect the expected claims the insurer will incur
for each class of risk. Solvency and actuarial soundness of rates will be
affected any time reforms lead to an environment where it is difficult,
if not impossible, to charge rates that reasonably reflect the expected
costs the insurer will incur for each class of risk. Therefore, the reforms
in this bill could place additional financial stress on insurers and could
lead to their financial insolvency.
Insurer rate bands will be based on the insurer's own average rate.
Some insurers will have lower average rates and some will have higher
average rates. Insurers that, coincidentally or because of underwriting
before reform, have insured populations with lower than average risk
can be expected to have a lower average (or community) rate. Other insurers could insure a population that has a greater proportion of higher
than average risks; their community rate is likely to be higher than the
community rate of insurers with lower than average risks. Insurers may
be able to absorb some losses for a period of time, but continued deterioration will force them out of the small group business. In addition,
other lines may subsidize these losses.
Insurers that have the majority of their business in the small group
market may not fare as well as insurers with a more diversified mix of
business. Insurers that are only in the health business may not have
the option of retaining losses until they can leave the market gracefully.
Unrecoverable losses could force them into insolvency, further disrupting the market and threatening coverage for their existing policyholders. Furthermore, this will be particularly disruptive to policyholders
in managed care networks and to provider-patient relationships.
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Changes in Insured/Uninsured Small Employers
Migration Effects on Small Employers Populations

In this section, the migration effects (also called the second order
effects) of H.R. 3626's rating restrictions, access provisions,9 and standardized benefits are examined. The migration effects are the effects
of employers and employees entering and leaving the small employer
group market as a direct result of the change in access rules and changes
in premiums.
The rating restrictions (described in Section 3) lirmt the premium
rate that insurers can charge high risk employers, making coverage
more affordable for high cost risks. At the same time, access provisions guarantee employers and employees the right to purchase coverage. This combination encourages insured high risk employers and
employees to retain their insurance coverage. The access provisions
also encourage uninsured high risk employers and employees to purchase insurance coverage. Guaranteed eligibility provisions assure that
all employees (working at least 17.5 hours a week for a small employer
with a health insurance plan) and their dependents will be eligible to
participate in their employer's plan. Guaranteed renewability provisions ensure that once an employer gets coverage, the employer will
not lose it.
In addition, H.R. 3626 increases the self-employed deduction for
health insurance benefits, and self-insurance 10 is limited. The effects of
the self-employed deduction and, to a lesser extent, the self-insurance
provision lead to changes in the insured small employer population.
The expanded benefits also increase premiums for small employers,
thus exacerbating population changes.
In the absence of rating restrictions, H.R. 3626's access provisions
will lead to some changes in who is insured. These prOvisions also will
lead to either higher rates for the groups affected, to increases in the insurers' average rate for all small employers, or to a combination of both.
When combined with the severe rate compression of the nearly flat community rating and the expanded benefits, however, access provisions
will increase rates significantly. These increases either (i) add to the
increases the majority of small employer groups receive; (ii) make the
9The H.R. 3626 access provisions also are summarized in Appendix B. The most
significant access reforms are guaranteed issue, guaranteed eligibility (whole group),
and guaranteed renewability.
tOH.R. 3626 limits the efficacy of self-insurance, but it does not prohibit it. Consequently, small employers for whom it is still advantageous to self-insure (even with the
2S percent excise tax) may choose to do so.
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employers that receive small decreases instead receive rate increases; or
(iii) reduce the rate decreases that employers receiving larger decreases
will receive.
In the following discussion of the migration effects of H.R. 3626's
rating restrictions, the following should be kept in mind:
1. In this section, the insured population is changing. Also, there is

no mandate on the employer to provide, or on the employee to
obtain, coverage, Le., it is a voluntarv market;
2. The effects of migration are examined using sensitivity tests on
a range of assumptions regarding how many insureds enter and
leave the market and the morbidity (net claim costs) of these migrants;
3. Because carriers are insuring a different population, the average
premium of each employer group and the aggregate premium over
all groups combined may change;
4. The difference in premium for all small employers is determined
by comparing the market average of premiums before reforms to
the market average of premiums after reforms. This difference is
in addition to the trend increase employers may receive in their
premiums and to the redistributional effects;
5. Migration effects also have an impact on the number of uninsured
small employers.

4.2

Methodology

The estimates in this section are derived from sensitivity analysis using the actuarial migration model described in Appendix C. The model
is a reasonable compromise between simplicity and complexity. It identifies those factors that need to be measured to understand the implications of small group reforms. In addition, the model shows which
of the factors have the greatest impact on premium changes as a result of reforms. The model splits the small employer health insurance
market into three blocks: (i) employer-provided insurance (including
self-insured employers); (ii) insurance from any other source; and (iii)
the uninsured.
The model addresses the movement of small employers into and out
of the health insurance market, but it does not attempt to simulate the
effect of employers moving between carriers within the market. While
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movement within the market may lower a particular employer's premium, it will not change total costs in the market unless employers
reduce their coverage at the same time. In the long run, any premium
shortfalls from insufficient rates will show up as future trend rate increases.
Starting with the small employer population and the morbidity pattern of each block before reforms, the population and morbidity of
insured small employers entering and leaving each of these blocks is
combined algebraically in the migration model in order to estimate the
small employer population and the morbidity pattern in each block after reforms.
The uninsured are segmented further into high and low risk individuals. Varying assumptions are used for how many individuals enter the
insured market from these two segments, as high risk individuals and
their employers have a greater incentive to enter the market and have
a greater impact on the increase in premiums as a result of H.R. 3626.
These assumptions are discussed in greater detail in Sections 4.6 and
4.7.
While population-based data are not consistent with developing exact numerical estimates, reasonable ranges can be developed for the
model's assumptions. (See Appendix C.) Consequently, it is necessary
to perform sensitivity tests on the results using different sets of assumptions, or scenarios, in order to test the full range of possible values for each variable. For purposes of illustration, these are narrowed
to three scenarios that bound the full range of outcomes: low cost,
most likely, and high cost. The results vary over a wide range and are
sensitive to some of the assumptions.

4.3

Impact on Premium per Capita

Migration effects will increase the premium per capita for all small
employer groups covered by an insurer equally. The premium per
capita for every employer group will increase above what it would have
been due to rating restrictions only. Employers scheduled to receive
rate increases will get higher increases. Employers due to receive rate
decreases will receive smaller decreases or no decreases. The distribution of premiums per capita for insured employer groups will change
to reflect the migration effects as well as redistributional effects.
The distribution of premiums per capita for currently insured employer groups after migration will be similar to the distribution in Figure
2 except the average premium (the 100 percent level) will be higher, i.e.,
Figure 2 shifts to the right for currently insured employers.
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Impact on Small Employers

H.R. 3626's access provisions, in conjunction with rating and benefit
provisions, will lead to population changes that will cause the average
premium per capita to rise for all small employers. This increase could
range from 8 to 24 percent of current premiums. This range is broad
because the estimated results are sensitive to critical assumptions that
are used in the migration model. The upper and lower ends of the
range can be considered extremes such that the most likely outcome
falls somewhere close to the middle of the range.
The premium increase from migration will be in addition to any increase or decrease that employers will receive from redistributing premiums to meet rating restrictions. For example, if a carrier has to raise
the average premium 12 percent for second order effects, any group
that previously received a 24 percent increase now will receive a 39
percent increase. (The impact on rates is cumulative, e.g., 1.24 x 1.12 =
1.3888, which is roughly a 39 percent increase.) Likewise, any group
that had received a 24 percent decrease from rate compression now
will receive only a 15 percent decrease (0.76 x 1.12 = 0.8512), effectively wiping out almost half of the benefit of the rating restrictions.
While it is possible to envision better or worse scenarios, it seems
most likely that employers will experience premium changes from -25
percent to +271 percent at renewal when the effects of trend and H.R.
3626 are combined (assuming an 18 percent trend factor). Thus, the
covariant effects of community rating in conjunction with guaranteed
access and expanded benefits effectively could undermine the goals of
greater access, affordability, and coverage in a voluntary market.
Some employers may respond to the rate increases caused by H.R.
3626 by dropping their coverage. Historically, however, employers receiving large trend or experience increases have not responded by dropping their coverage. Instead they try to retain their coverage by seeking
less costly alternatives such as reducing plan benefits or increasing employee contributions. Failing that, they may seek coverage through the
individual health insurance or self-insurance markets to the extent that
these markets provide cheaper alternatives after H.R. 3626 reforms.
Employees experiencing large rate increases also will seek lower cost
options. Some employees may choose to reduce their health insurance
premium by dropping family coverage in favor of single coverage on
the employee only or by increasing their deductibles and copayments.
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Impact on Insurers

The H.R. 3626 rating, access, and benefit provisions will make health
insurance more affordable and accessible for high risk groups and less
affordable for low risk employers. This will increase adverse selection,
i.e., persons who know that they have higher than average health care
costs will increase their purchase coverage while those who know that
they have lower than average costs will reduce their coverage. The tight
rating bands of H.R. 3626 cause more adverse selection than other proposals with less severe rating bands. Thus, H.R. 3626 leads to greater
adverse selection and greater changes in the insured, small employer
population than other proposals to date.
Because low risk insureds tend to shop for coverage (replace their
current coverage for lower cost coverage) more than high risk insureds,
insurers with lower average rates can be expected to attract more low
cost risks than those with higher average rates. This implies that, for
competitive/antis election reasons, some companies will not be able to
raise their rates high enough to cover expected claim costs. If their
in-force business eventually deteriorates to the point that it contains a
significantly disproportionate share of high cost insureds, the insurer
will be left with two equally poor choices: reduce rates (and hope that
the low cost risks will come) or raise rates and experience further deterioration of their claims experience.
Alternatively, those insurers experiencing enrollment losses as a result of employers dropping coverage (especially low risk ones) could
be forced to (i) strengthen and apply participation requirements more
strictly; (ii) expand self-insurance products for small employers; or (iii)
seek reinsurers/partners in order to spread the risk and maintain market share. The impact on insurers of current migrations of both large
and small employers toward self-insured, ERISA-protected plans l l provides strong empirical evidence of this tendency.
Insurers will be subject to the effects of adverse selection (even from
employers that maintain their coverage) if employees who will have to
contribute toward higher premiums choose to forego coverage instead.
The insurer still may cover the employer, but now fewer employees and
their dependents will be in the risk pool. It also can be presumed that
employees foregoing coverage will be, as a group, lower risk than those
remaining insured.
Insurers that guarantee issue coverage to a disproportionate share
of high risk insureds will face an additional risk: their small group busi11 ERISA plans are self-insured medical plans established by the United States
Congress in accordance with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
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ness will have a higher percentage of high cost claimants than their rates
anticipated. At the same time, rates only can be set within the allowable
rate bands, and rate increases are limited. It may become impossible to
offer an actuarially sound, competitive rate that attracts a reasonable
mix of high and low risk insureds to assure the integrity of the risk
pool. Insurers could find their total premium (from all small groups)
insufficient to pay their claims. This increases insurer uncertainty that
premiums will be sufficient to pay claims.
Risk margins in current rates are based upon the level of uncertainty
(the probability that actual costs will vary from expected costs) that
exists in the current market. The increased uncertainty of the market
after reforms will encourage insurers to increase their risk margins.
The magnitude of the increase will depend on each insurer's specific
situation, and it is unlikely that any a priori estimate of its magnitude
will be credible.

4.6

Impact on the Uninsured

Estimating the number of uninsureds attached to the small employer
market is hindered by having to determine whether an establishment is
a small employer or part of a larger firm. For example, six dry cleaners
each with ten employees may be part of the same 60 employee firm or
they may be six separate ten employee firms-in both cases they will
be six establishments. The question of what to do about dependents
when both spouses work and both are uninsured, but one works for
a small firm and the other works for a large firm is also problematic.
Also, the data are not always split into the employer size categories
desired for analysis. In spite of these complications, algorithms have
been developed that address these issues. Estimates of the number of
small employer uninsured range from 11 to 15 million.
Even in the best scenario, indications are that the number of small
group uninsureds will increase rather than decrease under H.R. 3626,
contrary to the desired goal of this bill. As many as 0.6 million to 2.3
million Americans may reenter the market under H.R. 3626 reforms.
An estimated 1.2 million to 4.1 million more Americans may drop or
lose their coverage. The net effect will be an increase in the number of
uninsureds of 0.7 million to 1.9 million, increasing the number of small
group uninsureds 6 to 12 percent. Because small group uninsureds are
about half of the uninsured, however, H.R. 3626 will increase the total
number of uninsureds about 3 to 6 percent. If previous socioeconomic
patterns hold for these new uninsureds, the tendency will be for these
new uninsureds to be younger, lower income, and from the smallest
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employers. Many also will be children.
Certain assumptions related to the uninsured have a profound impact on the results of this study, so a short discussion of these assumptions is presented below. The migration model assumptions used
in each of the three scenarios are shown in Appendix C.

4.7

Number of High Risk Uninsureds

A key assumption is the number of high risk uninsured employees.
High risk uninsureds are medically uninsurable individuals who may be
denied health insurance under current medical underwriting practices.
Prior to a recent AHCPR (Agency for Health Care Policy and Research,
United States Department of Health and Human Services) study, reasonable estimates for this variable ranged from 7 to 12 percent. The AHCPR
study shows that only 36.8 percent of the uninsured have investigated
the cost of private health insurance; only 2.5 percent of that cohort
have ever been denied coverage or had their coverage limited. The 2.5
percent includes more than just medically uninsurable individuals and
includes those who have been excluded from individual (not just group)
coverage. It also includes those who ever have been rejected for a policy, whether they will be today or not. It does present an upper bound
for who may be medically uninsurable among the 36.8 percent who
have investigated coverage. Assuming the same proportion of uninsurable persons among those who haven't investigated coverage as among
those who have (a grossly conservative assumption), 6.8 percent of the
uninsured at most could be medically uninsurable.
Medically uninsurable individuals may not be distributed uniformly
among the various segments of the uninsured population. For example,
small employers could have a higher percentage of medically uninsurable employees than large employers. In case there is a disproportionate share of these high cost insureds among small group uninsureds,
7 percent is assumed to be the t'ow end of the range for small group
uninsureds. Even with the possibility of a biased distribution, however,
it appears that the 12 percent estimate for the top of the range for this
assumption is too conservative. But the 7 to 12 percent range used in
this study encompasses the most reasonable range of values available
from current research.

4.8

The Morbidity of Medically Uninsurable Employees

Current studies show that the morbidity of medically uninsurable
employees range anywhere from 200 percent of the net claim cost of
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the current small employer group market to as much as 500 percent.
Analysis of the experience of individual high risk pools, however, shows
that even when considered as individuals rather than as groups, the
experience for these high cost insureds only averages 350 percent of
the current small employer group market experience. Because groups
can be expected to have employees and dependents that are standard
or better risks to offset the additional claim cost of high cost insureds,
it is expected that, on average, the morbidity of high risk groups will
be less than the morbidity of individual high risk pools. For this study
a range of 248 to 300 percent of current small employer net claim cost
is used for this variable.

5 Standardized Benefits and Deductions
H.R. 3626 mandates a generous preexisting condition limitation, the
preemption of state mandates, the addition of preventive services with
first dollar coverage, and a standard benefit package similar to Parts
A and B of Medicare. In an attempt to place the self-employed on parity with all other employers, H.R. 3626 increases the self-employed deduction for health care expenses to 100 percent of expenses. These
provisions are described in Appendix B.
The standardized benefits detailed below are expected to increase
small employer premiums about 4 to 5 percent overall because these
benefits are more generous in aggregate than the average plan of benefits small groups currently offer. The impact of the deductions is harder
to quantify. The following is a description of the standardized benefits
and deductions .
• Preexisting Condition limitation: Based on data from HIAA's employer survey and HIAA calculations using the 1994 Tillinghast
Group Medical Insurance Rate Manual,12 it is estimated that reducing the preexisting condition limitation period to a required
maximum of six months will add about 2 percent to an average
policy.
• Standard Benefit Package, Including Preventative Services: The
standard benefits package (except for some of the preventive benefits) will be less than a standard employer provided plan in some
12The 1994 Tillinghast Group Medical Insurance Rate Manual is published by Tillinghast, 101 South Hanley Street, St. Louis MO 63105-3411, USA.
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states, while in other states the H.R. 3626 plan will be more generous. The net effect is estimated to be about a 1 percent increase
in the avprage premium from current levels .
• Elimination of State Mandates: The effect of eliminating state
mandated benefits and policy provisions is included in the pricing of the standard benefit package. The reduction for eliminating
state mandates is not readily apparent because H.R. 3626 mandates a package of benefits that, with the exceptions above, is
similar to the average small employer plan. Furthermore, for a
small employer that offers its employees a plan with fewer benefits than the H.R. 3626 minimums, rate increases will be even
higher than this analysis otherwise indicates.
• Self-Employed Deduction: It is difficult to estimate the impact of
the self-employed deduction provision. Though the self-employed
population is small compared to the total population, it is reasonable to assume some increase. For example, increasing this
deduction will tend to encourage the self-employed with above
average costs to seek insurance more than it may encourage the
self-employed with below average costs to seek insurance. This
is evident in the results of the 1987 national medical expenditure
survey13 that show individually insured persons have much higher
cost and risk than group insureds. I estimate that this may add
another 1 to 2 percent to the average premium.

6

Cost Containment Provisions

H.R. 3626 calls for the establishment of a national health care cost
containment commission shortly after enactment of the bill. It also
requires the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services
to establish optional maximum payment rates for hospitals, physicians,
and other health services by October 1, 1994 and annually thereafter.
The rates are to be based on DRG and RBRVS methodologies similar to
those Medicare currently uses.
This approach to cost containment will not contain health care costs
effectively because it does nothing to control the fundamental sources
of health care cost increases other than medical price inflation.
13The national medical expenditure survey is a detailed survey of the health expenditures of Americans and their families. This survey is sponsored by the US Agency
for Health Care Policy and Research, Department of Health and Human Services, 200
Independence Avenue SW, Washington DC 20201.
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The most important sources of health care cost increases are medical cost inflation, cost shifting, utilization (the number of health care
services used), adverse selection, defensive medicine, and new technologies. In 1991 the medical cost inflation component was responsible
for only about a third of health care cost increases. Thus, an approach
that addresses only medical cost inflation addresses only) about onethird of the problem.
But H.R. 3626 may not control medical cost inflation effectively.
While some studies have estimated Significant savings from using current Medicare reimbursement maximums, it is by no means certain that
the payment rates eventually approved will be so low. Because the Secretary of Health and Human Services will be charged with establishing
maximum payment rates (without guidelines for how high these rates
could be), it is not certain that the maximum payment rates set by the
Secretary will contain costs effectively.
The only positive point that can be made regarding this approach is
that, to the extent that the maximum payment rates are used uniformly
by health care payors (including government payors), some reductions
in cost shifting may occur. It is reasonable to expect that insurers will
use these rates if they are legislated or if they are less than what the
insurer currently pays. Any insurer that does not likely will be at a
competitive disadvantage.
The H.R. 3626 cost containment provisions are still too nebulous to
justify any estimated reduction in costs at this time.

7

Provisions Not Quantified

The number and complexity of health insurance market reform proposals have outstripped the available data, and H.R. 3626 is no exception. Consequently, it is impossible to quantify certain provisions in
the bill. In some cases more data and analysis are needed. In others
data are not available to estimate credibly the impact of certain reforms
on the market.
Some of the provisions not speCifically quantified in this study are
the minimum plan period, the notice of renewal, the index rate variation
between blocks, the types of family enrullment, the transfers among
blocks, the 5 percent limit on rate increases above trend, the geographic
factors limited to MSAs,14 the self-insurance prohibition, the uniform
claims forms, and the uniform reporting standards.
14As defined by the United States Census Bureau, MSA means a metropolitan statistical area, e.g., Hartford, Connecticut.

30

Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 2, No.1, 1994

Although the effect of H.R. 3626 on employees purchasing single
coverage versus employees purchasing family coverage is not analyzed
in this study, an independent study by an HIAA member company
shows H.R. 3626 can be expected to increase rates for single coverage
more than for family or single parent coverages. (Increases for singles
are estimated to be five times greater.)
Some covariant effects cannot be analyzed with the data available
and are beyond the scope of this study. For example, how geographic
factors may change in the absence of other risk classification factors
(such as industry or full age/gender rating) is not examined. As the
scope of this study is limited to the effects of H.R. 3626 on the small
employer group health insurance market, the impact of portability requirements on employers other than small employers is not analyzed.
Similarly, the impact of H.R. 3626 on association groups and employerprovided individual health insurance is also beyond the scope of this
study.
No specific attempt is made in this study to measure H.R. 3626's
effect on the solvency of employers and insurers. But the magnitude of
rate increases for some employers and the likelihood that certain insurers will get a disproportionate share of high risk insureds will have an
impact on their solvency. Also, it is not possible to include the impact
of state regulations already promulgated. For example, some states
have passed laws similar to the rating restrictions and other provisions
in this bill. In these states, to the extent that premiums and the market
already reflect these changes, H.R. 3626 will have less impact.

8 Summary and Conclusions
H.R. 3626 tries to marry the social goals of guaranteed availability,
community rating, and generous standard benefits. It doesn't consider
sufficiently the realities of price-sensitive small employers and individual employees acting in their own best interest in a highly competitive,
voluntary market.
While improving availability and affordability of health insurance for
a minority of small employers, H.R. 3626's rating restrictions increase
premiums disproportionately for the majority of small employers. Employers with younger, lower income employees will be forced to subsidize employers with older, higher income employees. Smaller small
employers will subsidize larger small employers. Premiums no longer
will reflect expected claims, except in the aggregate, exacerbating the
tendency in small employer markets to be uninsured due to cost.
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Changes in the insured small employer population as a result of H.R.
3626 will increase the average premium per capita of all small employer
groups 8 to 24 percent, largely as a result of the severe rating restrictions. The premium per capita for almost every small employer group
either will increase or decrease, and the distribution of premiums per
capita for insured employer groups will change, generally worsening.
In effect, H.R. 3626 proposes a solution that affects 100 percent of insured small employers, most of them negatively, in order to address a
problem that afflicts less than 15 percent of small employers.
Some employers will respond to the H.R. 3626 rate increases by
dropping their coverage altogether. Based on my experience with selling coverage to small employers, it seems far more likely that small
employers who currently have coverage will do what they have always
done when faced with significant rate increases. They will seek less
costly alternatives such as reducing benefits to the minimum allowable
(if their benefits are currently more generous), increasing employee contributions (employee share of the premium), self-insuring (if feasible),
or utilizing the individual health insurance market.
While the full impact is not yet clear, the impact of the community
rating law for small employers in New York State seems consistent with
this conclusion. Young and healthy lives have dropped out of the system, claims costs have risen, and, at least anecdotally, small employers
and individuals are choosing less generous benefit plans. (New York
does not mandate a minimum or standard benefit plan.) Mitigating any
negative impact of reforms in New York State is the implementation of
a risk adjustment mechanism for risk pooling across the individual and
small group markets. If H.R. 3626 had contained such a provision, the
impact on rates and the market would be less.
Employees experiencing large rate increases also will seek lower cost
alternatives. Employees could choose to drop their coverage or reduce
their contribution toward premiums by dropping family coverage in
favor of single coverage on the employee only.
H.R. 3626 will increase the risk to insurers of providing small employer coverage. Coupled with a hostile regulatory environment wherein
rate increases often are reduced or denied, insurers will find it increasingly difficult to charge premiums that are adequate to protect existing
policyholders. In response, insurers staying in the market may try to
strengthen and apply participation requirements more strictly, increase
risk margins, expand self-insurance products to small employers, reduce rates below an actuarially sound level (in an attempt to achieve or
maintain a standard mix of risks), or develop more innovative responses
that will protect the insurer from insolvency.
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In a highly competitive, voluntary insurance market, the actuarial
process of rating, the underwriting process of risk selection, and the
competitive market in which they operate are symbiotic. Actuarially
sound rates are established to ensure the solvency of the insurer in
order to protect its policyholders. If these rates are too high, some
persons will not purchase insurance. If rates are too low, there will
not be sufficient reserves to pay policyholder claims. If the insurer
screens too many risks, there will not be sufficient policyholders to
cover the costs of operating the business. If the insurer screens too
few or does not assign the appropriate rate to high risk policyholders,
it will not have sufficient reserves to pay policyholder claims. There is
always a decision to be made regarding costs versus benefits whenever
considering changes to any of these processes-changing one affects
all.
H.R. 3626 fails this litmus test of cost/benefit analysis. It does so,
in large part, because of its severe rating restrictions. In the current
market where health care costs are such a large proportion of nonsalary
employee expenses, employers are looking to reduce this expense and
are unwilling to subsidize actuarially higher risk insureds of another
employer. If their employees are actuarially low risk, they demand low
premiums. Otherwise, they do not purchase insurance. Consequently,
forcing insurers in a free market to charge premiums that do not reflect
the expected claims of insureds (thereby forcing large rate increases on
most small employers) in order to satisfy a social goal will not produce
the intended result.
This study shows that it is not the guaranteed issue/availability provisions of H.R. 3626 that lead to most of the small employer premium
increases; rather it is the bill's rating restrictions. Other small group
reform proposals with less severe rating restrictions will provide the
benefits of guaranteed availability without the onerous rate increases
precipitated by H.R. 3626.
In clOSing, although H.R. 3626 will improve availability of coverage
for small employers and portability of coverage for all employees, the
severe rating restrictions will lead to more persons being uninsured. It
will force many small employers to pay a high price to make coverage
more affordable for a few small employers. In short, the costs of this
bill will far exceed its benefits.
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Appendix A: H.R. 3626, Summary of Benefit Provisions
Table Al
Summary of the Basic Benefit Provisions of H.R. 3626
Brief Description

Provision
Group Size
Transitional Period
Availability
Individual Policies
Case Characteristics
Rating Restrictions

Renewal Rating
Renewability

Whole Groups
Reinsurance
Reinsurance Price
Cost Sharing
Assessments

Two to 50 employees (portability provisions
apply to all group health plans);
Various, but up to three years for some
provisions;
Guaranteed issue (year round; uniform waiting
periods and minimum participation requirements allowed);
Not applicable to individual policies (unless
provided by employer);
Age, gender, and geography (no smaller than
MSA);'
Community rating such that variations between
plocks of business shall not exceed 20 percent.
Age and sex adjustments may be used, but only
up to ±25 percent and only if applied to all
small employers;
May not exceed the sum of the percentage
change in the base premium rate plus 5 percentage points;
• Guaranteed renewable except for nonpayment
of premiums, fraud or misrepresentation, and
failure to maintain minimum participation
rates;
• Must give notice 60 days prior to renewal
date; terms of renewal must be same as at
issue except for premiums and administrative
changes;
Coverage must be offered to any eligible
employee and dependent;
Not included;
Not applicable;
Not applicable;
Not applicable;

'MSA ~ Metropolitan statistical area.
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Table Al (continued)
Summary of the Basic Benefit Provisions of H.R. 3626
Provision

Brief Description

Portability

These provisions apply to all group health plans:
• Excise tax for failure to provide all of these
portability benefits (25 percent of gross premiums);
• Prohibition against denying, limiting, or conditioning coverage (or benefits) on health
status;
• Maximum six month preexisting condition
limitation (except for newborns);
• Continuity of coverage provision that mandates credit for prior coverage if no more than
a three month break in coverage;
• Self-employed deduction increased to 100 percent;
• Applies to employees working at least 17.5
hours per week;
• deductible standard benefit package with pre-.
ventive benefits;
• Preemption of state mandates beyond standard benefit package;
• percent excise tax on self-insured;

Other

• Any payor may choose to use DRC" and
RBRVSt schedules;

Effective Date

• Must offer single, couple, single parent, and
family rates
Various: depends on provision (some on January
I, 1992).

"DRG = Diagnosis-related group.
tRBRVS = Resource-based relative value scale.
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Appendix B: H.R. 3626, Summary of Provisions Affecting Rating
H.R. 3626 has provisions that apply to small groups (defined as employer groups of two to 50 employees) and all employer groups, including self-insured plans. An employee is defined as any worker who
normally works at least 17.5 hours per week.
Self-employed deduction: The amount of deduction for self-employed individuals is extended indefinitely, starting in 1993. The
deduction increases from 25 percent to 50 percent in 1993, 75
percent in 1994, and 100 percent in 1995 and subsequent years.
Preemption of state-mandated benefits: States cannot mandate
benefits beyond those in the standard benefit package, but they
can establish more stringent requirements in other areas.
Guaranteed eligibility: Insurer cannot exclude any eligible employee or dependent to whom the employer offers coverage.
Guaranteed issue: Insurers offering a plan to small employers in
a community must offer it to all employers in the area year round.
Waiting periods are allowed if applied to all employees.
Minimum plan period: Rating basis applies for 12 months.
Guaranteed renewability: Insurers only can nonrenew and cancel
for nonpayment of premiums, fraud, misrepresentation, or failure
to maintain minimum participation rates.
Notice of renewal (expiration): Insurers must give notice 60 days
prior to the renewal date. Terms of renewal must be the same as
at issue except for premiums and administrative changes.
Discrimination based on health status: Insurers cannot deny,
limit, or condition coverage or benefits based on an individual's
"health status, claims experience, receipt of medical care, medical
history or lack of evidence of insurability." An exception is made
to this provision to allow for the preexisting condition exclusion.
Index rate variation between blocks: This must be less than 20
percent unless the block is one that always has provided open enrollment, the insurer never has transferred groups into the block
involuntarily, and the block is currently available for purchase
when an exception to the 20 percent rule is sought.
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Community rating: Must be used within a block.
Age and sex adjustments: This may be used if applied consistently to all small employers. Maximum variation is ±25 percent.
Definition of community: Not smaller than an MSA.
Types of family enrollment: Insurers must have separate rates
for single adults, childless couples, single parents, and families.
Transfers among blocks: Insurer cannot force an employer to
transfer among blocks and may not transfer an employer unless
the transfer is offered to all small employer plans and unless it is
not based on demographics, experience, or date of issue.
limits on rate increases: Increase may not exceed the percentage
change in the base premium rate plus 5 percent (500 basis points).
Definitions:
1. A block (of business) consists of the small employer plans issued by an insurer. Distinct groups can be treated as separate
blocks based on whether the group is marketed through direct response, has been acquired from another insurer, or is
provided via an association of at least 25 small employers.

2. The reference premium rate is the lowest rate charged or
available to any actuarial class.
3. The index rate is 133 1/3 percent of the reference premium
rate.
4. The base premium rate, though not specifically defined, can
be defined to be the index rate.
Standard benefit package:
1. In general, same as Parts A and B of Medicare.
2. Unlimited inpatient hospital coverage for children without
coinsurance. (The deductible is not excluded.)
3. Maternity (including prenatal, inpatient labor and delivery,
postnatal, and postnatal family planning).
4. The $250/500 deductible is indexed for future inflation.
5. The individual out-of-pocket limit of $2500/3000 is indexed
for inflation in future years.
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6. Preventive services must be provided without deductible or
coinsurance. These services include: maternity, well-child
care (including dental), screening mammography, screening
pap smear, colorectal screening, and certain immunizations.
Others may be added at a later date. Their are limitations on
what providers may charge for these. Effective 1/1/92.
Self-insurance prohibition: Small employers (two to 50 employees, including self-employed) may not self insure. This is enforced
through a 25 percent excise tax on health care expenditures by
self-insured plans.
Preexisting condition limitation (PCL) for all groups: Limits preexisting condition exclusion to six months with a further proviso
that prior coverage must be credited toward the six months as
long as there isn't more than a three month lapse in coverage.
PCL cannot be applied to newborns and is defined as a condition
diagnosed or treated during the three months prior to issue. This
applies to all employers. Effective 1/1/93.
Other portability provisions: In addition to the PCL, the portability provisions are an excise tax for failure to provide all of these
portability benefits (25 percent of gross premium for plan); a prohibition against denying, limiting, or conditioning coverage (or
benefits) on health status; and a continuity of coverage provision
that mandates credit for prior coverage if no more than a three
month break in coverage has occurred. All of the portability provisions apply to all group health plans, regardless of size, including
self-insured plans.
Cost containment: This includes optional rates (prices) for hospitals, physicians and other medical prOviders, DRGs, and RBRVS.
Any health care purchaser, including individuals, can choose to
use promulgated rates. Providers must accept these rates as payment in full.
Uniform claims forms: Effective 1/1/94.
Uniform reporting standards: For development of rates (prices)
to be used in cost containment efforts. Effective 1/1/93.
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Appendix C: H.R. 3626: The Impact of Migration

Table Cl
Assumptions for Migration Modeling Under the
Optimistic, Best Estimate, and Pessimistic Scenarios
Assumption
Total Market
Distribution (before reforms):
A. Employer-sponsored
B. Individually-insured
C. Uninsured
Morbidity of Population as a
Percentage of EmployerSponsored Net Claims Cost
(before migration):
A. Employer-sponsored
B. Individually-insured
C. Uninsured
Employer-Sponsored Insureds
Withdrawing From Small
Employer Market:
A. % withdrawing
B. Morbidity
Individually Insureds
Withdrawing From Small
Employer Market:
A. % withdrawing
B. Morbidity

Optimistic

Best Estimate

Pessimistic

45,000,000

50,000,000

55,000,000

55%
20%
25%

51.36%
22.31%
26.33%

50.0%
22.5%
27.5%

100.00%
100.00%
75.04%

100.00%
100.00%
80.62%

100%
120%
102%

5%
24%

10%
32%

15%
40%

5%

5%

5%

100%

120%

120%
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Table Cl (continued)
Assumptions for Migration Modeling Under the
Optimistic, Best Estimate and Pessimistic Scenarios
Assumption
Additions of Uninsureds to
Small Employer Market:
A. Percentage of uninsureds
who are medically
uninsurable

Optimistic

Best Estimate

Pessimistic

7%

10%

12%

25%

50%

100%

C. Percentage of all
uninsureds purchasing
coverage after reforms

5%

10%

15%

D. Morbidity of medically
uninsurables

248.08%

248.08%

300%

E. Morbidity of uninsureds
who are not medically
uninsurable

62.02%

62.02%

75.00%

B. Percentage of medically
uninsurables purchasing
coverage after reforms

Note: Total Market
any changes

=

Population (employees and dependents) in small employer market before

~

o

Table C2
Best Estimate of Financial Impact of H.R. 3626 Small Group Reforms (Without Guaranteed Issue):
Basic Set of Assumptions
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

B. Individually insured
C. Uninsured
TOTAL

....0

~

25,680,000

51.36%

100.00%

$1,470.74

1.95

11,155,000
13.165.000
50,000,000

22.31%
26.33%
100.00%

100.00%
80.62%
94.90%

$1,470.74
$1,185.71
$1,395.69

1.95
1.45
1.79

B. Remain in market
Subtotal

»
n
,....
s:::

$lJ

:::!.

~

"....

Impact of Migration on:
ER-Sponsored Insureds:
A. Withdraw from market t

0

s:::
....
:::l

Total Market (before migration):
A. ER' -sponsored Insureds

'--

(5)

$lJ

n
~.
n

2,568,000

10.0%

32.00%

$470.64

1.95

23,112,000
25,680,000

90.0%
100.00%

107.56%

$1,581.86

1.95

~rD

<

0

N

Z

~

Individually Insureds:
A. Migrate to SGM*

B. Remain individually insured
Subtotal

557,750

5.0%

120.00%

$1,764.89

1.95

10.597,250
11,155,000

95.0%
100.0%

98.95%

$1,455.26

1.95

\0
\0

,l:>.

Uninsureds (UIs):
A. -MUIs migrating to SGM
-Insurables entering SGM
B. Uninsureds who remain
Subtotal

:J:

658,250
658,250
11,848,500
13,165,000

5.0%
5.0%
90.0%
100.0%

248.08%
62.02%
72.35%

$3,648.61
$912.15
$1,064.08

1.45
1.45
1.45

s:u

3
3
o
:J
c..
:J:

?"
w

Total Market (after migration):

A. ER-sponsored insureds
B. Individually insured
C. Uninsured
TOTAL

24,986,250
10,597,250
14,416,500
50,000,000

49.97%
21.19%
28.83%
100.00%

110.34%
98.95%
65.16%
94.90%

$1,622.75
$1,455.26
$958.37
$1,395.69

1.92
1.95
1.52
1.79

O"l

N

O"l

:J:

en

s:u

;::;:-

:::;

Note: Column headings are as follows: (1) Number of Covered lives; (2) Percent of subtotal or total in column (1);
(3) Ratio of Net claim Costs to Market Cost (Market Cost = $1470.74); (4) Cost Per Covered life; and (5) Average Family Size.
Data in columns (2) to (5) are rounded to two decimal places.
·ER = Employer.

:J

tThese withdrawing employer-sponsored insureds are now considered as uninsured.

;::0

'SGM = Small group market.
§MUI = Medically uninsured.
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Table C3
Best Estimate of Financial Impact of H.R. 3626 Small Group Reforms (Without Guaranteed Issue):
Calculations Using Data From Table C2

Total Market (before migration):
A. Employer-sponsored insureds
B. Individually insured
C. Uninsured
TOTAL
Impact of Migration on:
Employer-Sponsored Insureds:
A. Withdraw from market
B. Remain in market
Individually Insured:
A. Migrate to small group market
B. Remain individually insured

(6)

(7)

37,768,603,200
16,406,104,700
15,609.879,891
69,784,587,791

13,169,231
5,720,513
9,079,310
27,969,054

(8)
$2,867.94
$2,867.94
$1,719.28
$2,495.06

(9)
$239.00
$239.00
$143.27
$207.92

I..-

0

s::
....

::l

~

0
....,

:t>
n

.....
s::

III

1,208,595,302
36,560,007,898

1,316,923
11,852,308

$917.74
$3,084.63

$76.48
$257.05

~.

~
-0
III

....

n
!:!.
n

984,366,282
15,421,738,418

286,026
5,434,487

$3,441.53
$2,837.75

$286.79
$236.48

-(I)

<
0
N

Uninsured:
A. Uninsured MUIs' migrating

Insurable migrants
Subtotal migrating
B. Uninsureds who remain

Z

2,401,698,712

453,966

$5,290.49

$440,87

600,424,678
3,002,123,390
12,607,756,501

453,966
907,931
8,171,379

$1,322.62
$3,306.55
$1,542.92

$110.21
$275.55
$128.57

0

1.0
1.0
..j::.

::c

Total Market (after migration):

A. Employer-sponsored insureds
B. Individually insured
C. Uninsured
TOTAL

~

40,546,497,570
15,421,738,418
13,816,351,803
69,784,587,791

13,046,264
5,434,487
9,488,302
27,969,054

$3,107.90
$2,837.75
$1,456.15
$2,495.06

$258.99
$236.48
$121.35
$207.92

3
3
o

:::l

0..

::c

Note: Column headings are as follows: (6) Total Cost; (7) Number of Covered Employees; (8) Annual Cost Per Employee;
(9) Monthly Cost Per Employee.

;;0

'MuIs = Medically uninsureds.
Data in columns (8) and (9) are rounded to two decimal places.
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Table C4
Best Estimate of Financial Impact of H.R. 3626 Small Group Reforms:
Increase in Employer-Sponsored Insured Small Group Net Claim Cost
due to Guarantees and Other Benefits After Reforms
(Calculations Using Data From Tables C2 and C3)
(1)

Guarantees!
Other Benefits 2
TOTAL
Percentage Change

10.3%
4.0%
14.3%

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

':l

$152.01
$58.83
$210.84

$2,777,894,370
$1,469,931,093
$4,247,825,463

$239.96
$112.67
$352.63

$20.00
$9.39
$29.39

14.3%

11.2%

12.3%

12.3%

Note: Column headings are as follows: (1) Increase in the Ratio of Net Claim Costs to Market Cost;
(2) Increase in the Cost Per Covered life; (3) Increase in the Total Cost; (4) Increase in the Annual Cost Per
Employee; and (5) Increase in the Monthly Cost Per Employee.
IThese include guaranteed issue, eligibility, and renewability; community rating; and rating restrictions.
%ese include preexisting condition limits, self-employment deduction, preventive services, elimination of
mandates, cost containment, and the standard benefit package.
Column (1): 10.3% is taken from 110.34% in Table C2, column; and 4.0% is based on information in Section 5.
Column (2) = Column (1) x 1470.74.
Column (3): 2,777,894,370 = 40,546,497,570 - 37,768,603,200; and 1,469,931,093 = 58.83 x 24,986,250.
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Table C5
Best Estimate of Financial Impact of H.R. 3626 Small Group Reforms:
ER-Sponsored Net Claim Cost After Reforms (Migrations, Guarantees, and limits Included)
Calculations Using Data From Tables C2, C3, and C4
(1)

Total
ER*-Spononsored
(Before Reforms)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

$1,470.74

$37,768,603,200

1.95

(7)

:J:

?::J
VJ

(8)

en
en

N

:J:

25,680,000

100.00%

13,169,231

$2,867.94

In
III

;::;:-

:::r
:::l

Increases due to:
Current insureds
Migrations
Subtotal

In

s::

-2,568,000
1.874,250
-693,750

14.34%
14.34%

$1,096,120,368
$3,151.705,095
$4,247,825,463

""'

III
:::l

-1,316,924
1.193,957
13,046,264

n

In
;;J:I

In

0'

Total
ER-Sponsored
(After Reforms)

24,986,250

97.30%

114.34%

$1,681.58

$42,016,428,663

1.92

13,046,264

$3,220.57

3

Note: Colurrm headings are as follows: (1) Number of Covered lives; (2) Percentage of Total Number of Employer-Sponsored lnsureds; (3) Ratio of
Net Claim Costs to Market Cost (Market Cost = $1470.74); (4) Cost Per Covered Life; (5) Total Cost; (6) Average Family Size; (7) Number of Covered
Employees; and (8) Annual Cost Per Employee.
*ER = Employer.
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